Accident Models
In 1969, Jean Surry, department of industrial engineering,
University of
In Surry’s view, an accident can be described by a series of questions, forming a sequential hierarchy of levels, where the answers to each question determine whether an event turns out as an accident or not. Surry’s model reflects the principles of human information processing, and is based upon the notion of an accident as a deviation from an intended process.
Think about that for a minute, an accident as a deviation from an intended purpose.
No one intended that the Challenger mission would fail, yet it did. It was not an accident as there were clear signals as to possible mission failure yet the mission was launched anyway. The cause of the accident was not a deviation from the intended purpose but as a result of failure to analyze the risk potential correctly.
Jean Surry grouped the theoretical and conceptual accident frameworks she identified into five different categories and concluded that none of these models is incompatible with any of the others; each simply stresses different aspects. This inspired her to combine the various frameworks into one comprehensive and general model.
The model indicated that the steps leading up to an accident included:
a. Warning of danger buildup
b. Perception of warning
c. Recognition of warning
d. Perception of avoidance mode
e. Decision to attempt to avoid
f. Ability to avoid
Later models were developed and modified by various
committees that simply re-worked the Surry model or expanded on it. The 1973
WEF model (Swedish Work Environment Fund) and a later version by a research
group in Malmö (
After a potential risk has been identified, the Malmö model defined 5 very important decision processes:
1. Can the danger be avoided
2. Does the person know how to avoid the danger
3. Is there freedom of choice
4. Does the person decide to avoid the danger
5. Can she or he avoid the danger?
Simplistic, covers all the bases, and reflects the basic steps found in any well developed business continuity plan. If the Challenger management had followed these five basic criteria for accident avoidance, the flight could have gone differently.
When considering interplanetary or lunar colonial development the only criteria related to design, development and management or governance should be mission survivability.
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